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Abstract. The pairwise independence of events does not entail their setwise independence (Bernstein’sexample, 1910-1917). The probability distributions of all pairs of events do not determine the probabilitydistribution of the whole set of events (the triangular room paradox of negative probabilities of events[8, 9, 2001]). The pairwise preferences of events do not determine their setwise preferences (Blyth’sparadox, 1972). The eventological theory of setwise event preferences, proposed in [8, 2007], gives an eventjustiﬁcation and extension of the classical theory of preferences and explains Blyth’s paradox «of threepies»1 (that was already well-known to Yule2) by human ability to use triplewise and morewise preferences.
Keywords. Eventology, event, probability, preference, pairwise event preferences, setwise event preferences,theory of setwise event preferences.
1 Introduction
The fact that pairwise independence of events does not imply setwise independence of events wasmentioned for the ﬁrst time in the correspondence in the years 1910 to 1917 between Chuprov3 andMarkov4. The bright example of the fact is attributted usually to Bernstein5 with reference to [1, 1946,page 48].
In [9, 2016] an improved generalization of Feynman’s6 paradox of negative probabilities [3, 4] forobserving three events which is directly related to the theory of quantum computing is presented. Thisgeneralization, ﬁrst proposed in [7, 2001] and called the «paradox of the triangular room of negativeprobabilities of events», clearly demonstrates the fact that three probability distributions of pairs ofevents from a given triplet are insuﬃcient to determine the probabilistic distribution of the whole tripletof events. In other words, three pairwise (partial) probability distributions of events do not determinethe triplewise (joint) probability distribution of the whole triplet of events.
In this paper, I intend to brieﬂy show the main advantages of the new theory of setwise event preferencesdeveloped in [8], and at the same time to demonstrate once again the failure of the pairwise to describethe whole. This time, using the example of preferences, when each of us is forced to make a comparisonevery time, hitting the next situation of choice, which requires a decision. The theory of setwise eventpreferences shows that the familiar pairwise comparisons do not provide a complete description of the
c 2016 O.Yu.Vorobyev
Oleg Vorobyev (ed.), Proc. XV FAMEMS'2016, Krasnoyarsk: SFU
1Colin R. Blyth was a Canadian mathematician.2Yule, George Udny (1871–1951) was a Scotland statistician. An important contribution to the theory and practice of correlation,regression, time series analysis. Yule’s distribution, discrete power law, andmany other statistical concepts are named in his honor.3Alexander Alexandrovich Chuprov (1974–1926)was a Russian statistician whoworked onmathematical statistics, sample surveytheory and demography.4Andrey Andreyevich Markov (1856–1922) was a Russian mathematician. He is best known for his work on stochastic processes.A primary subject of his research later became known as Markov chains and Markov processes.5Sergei Natanovich Bernstein (1880–1968) was a Russian and Soviet mathematician of Jewish origin known for contributions topartial differential equations, differential geometry, probability theory, and approximation theory.6Richard Phillips Feynman (1918–1988) was an American scientist. The main achievements relate to the ﬁeld of theoreticalphysics. One of the creators of quantum electrodynamics. Nobel Prise in Physics in 1965 for his contributions to the developmentof quantum electrodynamics.
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whole set of preferences that can be trapped at every step. A vivid example of this failure of the pairwiseto describe the whole is the explanation of the eventological theory of setwise event preferences of thefamous Blyth’s paradox «of three pies» [2, 1972].
2 Make decisions on the base of setwise event preferences
How does a person make a decision? Clarify: «How does the person make an event decision?», becausefrom the point of view of the eventology theory [8] any decision accepted by a person is always anevent decision. Let (
;F ;P) be a probability space in which the eventological theory of setwise eventpreferences answers this question.
Once in the situation of choice, ﬁrst the person
1) perceives the event circumstances of the environment, that is, perceives a subset F  F  A ofhappened events-circumstances, in other words, perceives the happened terraced event ter(F==F) =\
f2F
f
\
f2F F
(
  f)  
 generated by the set of events-circumstances F  A. Then the person
2) is conscious of possible own event decisions, that is, realizes the subset of possible events-decisionsdeﬁned by F  F  A the subset of possible events-decisions DF  D  A, where the set of his ownevents-decisions D has the probability distribution p(DF ) = fp(D==D); D  DF g. After that the person
3) probabilistically chooses an event decision, that is, under the probability distribution p(DF ) the personchooses a subset of events-decisions D  DF  A, in other words, under p(DF ) the person choosesthe terraced event-decision ter(D==DF ) = \
d2D
d
\
d2DF D
(
   d)  
 from all terraced events-decisions
generated by the set DF . And at last the person
4) creates an event decision, that is, the person creates events-decisions from the choosen subset D 
DF  A (and does not create events-decisions from DF   D), in other words, the person creates theone terraced event-decision ter(D==DF )  
 from all terraced events-decisions generated by DF .
Now we are interested in the second and third stages of decision-making by person. These two stageshave long attracted the attention of both theorists and practitioners in decision-making and usually referto what is called theory of preferences or theory of choice. We will offer the theory of setwise event-basedpreferences or theory of setwise event-based choice, which includes the formulation and decision of thecommon problem of setwise event preferences and in passing explains the Blyth’s paradox «of three pies»[2, 5].
The Blyth Paradox (Simpson’s paradox, the Yule-Simpson effect) is a statistical paradox in which thepreferences of several groups of people change to the opposite, after the groups unite. With thisseemingly impossible result, one encounters surprisingly often in sociology and medical statistics. Theparadox was described by Simpson7 in 1951 [6] and by Yule in 1903 [10]. The name of the «Simpsonparadox» was given by Blyth in 1972 [2]. Since Simpson did not discover this paradox, a number ofauthors use impersonal names instead, such as the «reversal paradox» or the «amalgamation paradox».Since Blyth popularized this paradox with his vivid example of a choice of three pies, we call it
The Blyth paradox «of three pies». The restaurant owner, whose menu on different days contains adifferent subset of the set of three pies «Apple, Cherry, Blueberry», noticed that when only two pies areon the menu, one regular visitor prefers an apple pie before cherry pie and never orders blueberry pie.However, when the menu contains all three pies, the visitor suddenly begins to prefer Cherry beforeApple.
It would seem that we have a paradox: «the presence or absence of a third pie in the menu, which isnever preferred by the visitor, changes his preference between the other two for the opposite». However,everything is much simpler: «from two pies, Apple and Cherry, the visitor prefers Apple, and from all— Cherry». The point is that the choosing person does not have to always carry out only pairwisecomparisons and have only pairwise preferences, he is able to compare not only pairs of events, but also
7Simpson, Edward Hugh (b. 1922) is a British statistician best known for describing Simpson’s paradox [6].
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three, and consequently, an arbitrary set of events. In other words, the choosing person to be able to havenot only pairwise, but also triplewise and setwise preferences. Moreover, the choosing person is capableto prefer an arbitrary subset of events from the given set of events (to have a setwise event preference).These obvious eventological conclusions are the basis for the proposed by me theory of setwise eventpreferences, which, in a sense, generalizes the existing non-eventological theories of preferences and, inparticular, gives an eventological explanation of the Blyth paradox «of three pies».
3 Eventological explanation of Blyth’s paradox «of three pies»
Consider the detailed eventological explanation of Blyth’s paradox «of three pies» [2, 5], beforeintroducing the terminology of the theory of setwise event preferences, hoping that this simple examplewill help to master a new theory more quickly.
Let X = fx; y; zg = f«Apple»; «Cherry»; «Blueberry»g be a set of names of pies, F = ffx; fy; fzg =
f«Apple in menu»; «Cherry in menu»; «Blueberry in menu»g  A be a set of events-circumstances. Thenterraced events
ter(FX==F) = \
x2X
fx
\
x2X X
(
  fx) = «on menu there are name of pies from X = fx : fx 2 Fg  X»  

correspond to eight possible coincidences of events-circumstances FX  F, X  X. Let
D = fdx; dy; dzg = f«choice of Apple»; «choice of Cherry»; «choice of Blueberry»g  A
be a set of possible events-decisions of choosing person, and let DFX = fdx; x 2 Xg  D be a subset ofevents-decisions, «imposed on» the person by a subset of events-circumstances FX  F, X  X.
My eventological explanation of Blyth’s paradox suggests the following probability distribution of the setof possible events-decisions of D (See Venn diagrams in Fig. 1):
q(D) =
n
q(;); q(fdxg); q(fdyg); q(fdzg); q(fdx; dyg); q(fdx; dzg); q(fdy; dzg); q(fdx; dy; dzg)
o
= f0; 2=9; 4=9; 0; 0; 3=9; 0; 0g;
(1)
where the probabilities are arranged in accordance with the events-decisions of choosing from the menuthe corresponding combinations of names of pies: «Nothing, Apple,
:::::::
Cherry, Blueberry, Apple-Cherry,Apple-Blueberry, Cherry-Blueberry, Apple-Cherry-Blueberry».
In the theory of setwise event preferences, the probability distribution q(D) is called the triplewise eventpreference of the choosing person, since it deﬁnes a probability of set-choice by this person from thetriplet of events-decisions D  A, in other words, the probabilistic choice by this person of any subset ofthe events-decisions D  D.
In accordance with the triplewise setwise event preference (1), when the menu offers all three pies, i.e.,at the conﬂuence of all three events-circumstances: ter(F==F) = fx \ fy \ fz , the setwise choosing person8prefers to choose only one cherry pie (y) because q(fdyg) = max
DD
fq(D)g.
The triplewise event mono-preference is determined by the probabilities of the mono-choice9 from thetriplet of events-decisions. In the eventological explanation of the paradox in the case of monopletchoice from a triplet, the person prefers a cherry pie, the monoplet fdyg, i.e. the person has thefollowing mono-preference: «Apple,
::::::
Cherry, Blueberry»  f2=9; 4=9; 0g = fq(fdxg); q(fdyg); q(fdzg)g,becuase q(fdyg) maxfdgDfq(fdg)g:
The pairwise event mono-preferences are deﬁned by probabilities of monoplet choice from doublets ofevents-decisions, with probability distributions:
qxy =
n
qxy(;); qxy(fdxg); qxy(fdxg); qxy(fdx; dyg)
o
;
8Setwise choosing person is a person who is capable to choose any subset of events-decisionsD  D under the given probabilitydistribution q(D).9Monoplet choice is a choice ofmonoplets of events-decisions fdg  D.
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qxz =
n
qxz(;); qxz(fdxg); qxz(fdzg); qxz(fdx; dzg)
o
;
qyz =
n
qyz(;); qyz(fdyg); qyz(fdzg); qyz(fdy; dzg)
o
and are deﬁned by probability distribution of the triplet D  A. For example, the doublet probabilitydistribution qxy is deﬁned via the triplet probability distribution q(D) by formulas:
qxy(;) = q(;) + q(fdzg); qxy(fdxg) = q(fdxg) + q(fdx; dzg);
qxy(fdyg) = q(fdyg) + q(fdy; dzg);
qxy(fdx; dyg) = q(fdx; dyg) + q(fdx; dy; dzg):
In the eventological explanation of the paradox under monoplet choice from doublets the person has thefollowing event mono-preferences between corresponding doublets of events-decisions:
«
:::::
Apple, Cherry»  f5=9; 4=9g = fqxy(fdxg); qxy(fdyg)g,
«
::::::
Apple, Blueberry»  f2=9; 0g = fqxz(fdxg); qxz(fdzg)g,
«
:::::::
Cherry, Blueberry»  f4=9; 3=9g = fqxy(fdxg); qxy(fdyg)g
for the same reasons.
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Figure 1: Venn diagrams of events-decisions illustrating the explanation of Blyth’paradox «of three pies» based on the theory of setwise eventpreferences. Events-decisions «pie choice»— apple pie (x), cherry pie (y) and blueberry pie (z)— form the tripletD = fdx; dy; dzg with probabilitydistribution «Nothing, Apple, Cherry, Blueberry, Apple-Cherry, Apple-Blueberry, Cherry-Blueberry, Apple-Cherry-Blueberry»  «0, 3/9, 4/9, 0, 0, 2/9, 0,0», which is called a triplewise event preference of the choosing person. The triplewise event mono-preference «Apple,
:::::
Cherry, Blueberry»  «3/9, 4/9,
0» and pairwise event mono-preferences: «
::::
Apple, Cherry» = « 5/9, 4/9 », «
::::
Apple, Blueberry»  «3/9, 0», «
:::::
Cherry,Blueberry»  «4/9, 2/» are deﬁned by
the theory of setwise event preferences.
4 Deﬁnition of setwise event preferences
LetD  A be a set of events-decisions of the person, who is capable to make a setwise choice of subsets of
events-decisions in accordancewith the probability distribution q(D)=nq(D==D) = P(ter(D==D)); D  Do.
The set D is generated by the choosing person and is associated with a set of events-circumstance F  Aby a choosing map ' : 2F ! 2D, that assigns to each subset of events-circumstances F  F the onlyset of possible events-decisions DF = '(F )  D from which the person chooses subsets making ownprobabilistic set-wise choice. In other words, at the conﬂuence of events-circumstances F  F the personprobabilistically setwise chooses a subset of events-decisions D  DF from tha set DF in accordance withpartial probability distribution of DF :
q(DF ) =
n
q(D==DF ); D  DF
o
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where q(D==DF ) = P(ter(D==DF )) are probabilities of terraced events
ter(D==DF ) = \
d2D
d
\
d2DF D
(
  d); D  DF ;
generated by DF  D.
The probability distribution q(D) of the set of events-decisions D  A is associated with a probabilitydistribution p(F) of the set of events-circumstances F  A by conditional scheme formulas:
q(D==DF ) =
X
FF
q(D==DF jF )p(F ); D  D;
where p(F) = np(F==F); F  Fo is the probability distribution of the set of events-circumstances F  A,
and probabilities
q(D==DF jF ) = P(ter(D==DF ) \ ter(F ))
p(F )
taking all together for D  DF forms
q(D==DF jF ) =
n
q(D==DF jF ); D  DF
o
;
the conditional probability distribution of the set of events-decisions D  A under conditions ofhappened subsets of events-circumstances F  F. In other words, under happened terraced events-circumstances ter(F==F); F  F.
Deﬁnition (setwise event preference). The setwise event preference on the set of events-decisions D is the
probability distribution of the given set: q(D) = nq(D==D); D  Do. The event n-preference on the set of
events-decisions D is a set of probabilities of n-plets from the probability distribution of the given set:
qn(D) =
n
q(Dn==D); Dn  D
o where Dn  D is an n-plet of events-decisions from D (a subset of power
n = jDnj). In particular, the event empty-preference on the set of events-decisions D is a set that consistsof one probability q(;) 2 q(D) taking from the probability distribution of the given set: q0(D) = nq(;)o.The event mono-preference on the set of events-decisionsD is a set of probabilities of monoplets from the
probability distribution of the given set: q1(D) = nq(fdg==D); d 2 Do. The event doublet-preference on theset of events-decisionsD is a set of probabilities of doublets from the probability distribution of the given
set: q2(D) = nq(fd; eg==D); fd; eg  Do. Obviously, that q(D) = jDjX
n=0
qn(D):
A setwise event-prefernce deﬁnes a probabilistic setwise choice any subsets of events-decisions D fromthe set D by the person. An event empty-preference deﬁnes a probabilistic setwise choice of empty set ofevents-decisions from the setD by the person, in other words, it deﬁnes a probability of person’s inactivitywithin the set of events-decisions D. An event mono-preference and an event doublet-preference deﬁne aprobabilistic setwise choice of monoplets and doublets of events-decisions from the set D by the personcorrespondingly.
5 Basic eventological assumption of the theory of setwise event preferences
The theory of setwise event preferences is based on the non-trivial eventological assumption that themono-preferences of a person choosing only one event from the set of events X  A are deﬁned not by
the probabilities of the «mono events» x 2 X, in other words, not a set of probabilities10 nP(x); x 2 Xo;
but of probabilities of «terraced mono-events»
ter(fxg==X) = x \
0@ \
y2X fxg
(
  y)
1A ; x 2 X;
10As this is usually assumed in the different theories of preferences.
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Figure 2: All twenty four setwise preferences of a one event-decision from the set of events-decisionsD  D  A, that can be deﬁned on the triplet ofevents-decisionsD = fd; e; fg. The last column on the right is made up of six setwise event preferences, corresponding to the structure of the setwisepreferences in the Blyth paradox «of three pies». These six setwise preferences correspond to six possible options for renaming three events fromD.
enumerated by monoplets fxg  X, i.e. by a set of probabilitiesn
P
 ter(fxg==X); x 2 Xo:
These two sets of probabilities begin to coincide, as soon as the events x 2 X do not pairwise intersect,since then x = ter(fxg==X); x 2 X: However, in the situation of an arbitrary set of events X these two setsof probabilities can be completely different:n
P(x); x 2 X
o
6=
n
P
 ter(fxg==X); x 2 Xo:
For example, for any set of probabilities of events x 2 X there exists a structure of event dependenciessuch that P ter(fxg==X) = 0; x 2 X. In the theory of setwise event preferences, this means the completeabsence of a mono-choice, i.e. a making such a probabilistic setwise choice when the person neverchooses events x 2 X separately, but always— together with other events from X.
The main eventological assumption of the theory of setwise event preferences in the situation of aprobabilistic setwise choice is that the choice of n events forming an arbitrary subset Xn  X of power
n = jXnj is determined not by the probabilities of the following terraced events
pXn==X = P
terXn==X = P
 \
x2Xn
x
!
;
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i.e. of the intersections of all events from Xn, but by probabilities of other terraced events:
p(Xn==X) = P
ter(Xn==X) = P \
x2Xn
x
\
x2X Xn
(
  x)
!
;
which happens when only events from the subset Xn  X happens. Thus, in the general situation,the main eventological assumption replaces the set of probabilities npXn==X; Xn  Xo by a set of other
probabilities: np(Xn==X); Xn  Xo.
Of course, the meaning and signiﬁcance of the main eventological assumption of my theory of setwiseevent preferences do not reduce merely to a formal substitution one set of probabilities by another one.This eventological assumption allows us to clearly explain the Blyth paradox. This fact can only mean theone thing: the eventological assumption underlying the theory of setwise event-based preferences seemsto reﬂect more preferably the mechanism of human implementation of the probabilistic setwise choicethan the assumptions that are postulated by the different theories of preferences on the basis of onlypairwise comparisons.
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